In this paper, we develop a quantum key distribution protocol based on the GreenbergerHorne-Zeilinger states (GHZs). The particles are exchanged among the users in blocks through two steps. In this protocol, for three-particle GHZs three keys can be simultaneously generated. The advantage of this is that the users can select the most suitable key for communication. The protocol can be generalized to N users to provide N keys. The protocol has two levels for checking the eavesdroppers. Moreover, we discuss the security of the protocol against different attacks.
three constructs, namely, the BB84 protocol [2] , the B92 protocol [3] and the EPR protocol [4] .
The QKD has been experimentally demonstrated by different means as shown, e.g., in [5] .
Entanglement is one of the main ingredients in the quantum information theory [6] . Based on this property, various protocols have been developed. For instance, Ekert has introduced his famous protocol which makes two remote parties share a private secure key [4] . The quantum direct communication protocol has been described in [7] . The "ping-pong" protocol has been given to achieve deterministic direct communication between the legitimate users [8] . This protocol has advantages and disadvantages; it allows the transmission of either a secret key or the plaintext message. Nevertheless, it is insecure (quasi-secure) if it is operating in a noisy (perfect quantum) channel [9] . In these protocols, the Einstein-Polosky-Rosen state (EPR) has been used to distribute the quantum-cryptographic key. The security has been checked either by the violation of the Bell inequalities [10] or by the correlation of the EPR. Furthermore, Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states (GHZs) [11] have been already involved in the quantum cryptography [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] . These states are distinguished by a large Hilbert space compared to the EPR.
Precisely, in the GHZs protocols one can have two or more legitimate users. In the two users case, the distribution of the GHZs particles and the quantum states are asymmetrical between Alice and Bob. Additionally, the security can be established via the correlation of the GHZ triplet state , e.g., [15] . Nevertheless, in the multi-user case, say three users, there are sender, receiver and supervisor, who controls the entanglement and information transmission between the sender and the receiver, e.g., [13, 19, 21] . The users can get the key only by joint cooperation. In this respect, the protocol is secure against the dishonest user (if he or she exists) [13] . The GHZs have been used in the quantum secure direct communication [17, 22] and in the teleportation [16, 19] .
It is worth mentioning that the simultaneous quantum direct comminution between users based on the GHZs has been developed in [20] . Nevertheless, it has been proved that this protocol is not secure [23] . Finally, the GHZs have been experimentally implemented by various means, e.g., using entanglement swapping starting from three down converters [24] , using two pairs of entangled photons [25] , based on dipole-induced transparency in a cavity-waveguide system [26] , in the framework of the superconducting circuits [27] and nuclear magnetic resonance [28] .
In this communication, we develop a new protocol using the GHZs. More illustratively, we have three or more legitimate users and no controllers. The number of the keys, which can be generated in this protocol, equals the number of the users and/or the number of particles in the GHZs. In the proposed protocol, we apply the block-data transfer among the users [17] .
There are some basic differences between this protocol and the others that were given earlier [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] , as we will show below. Firstly, the legitimate users can simultaneously generate various keys. Each user does not need the cooperation of the other users to obtain these keys. Eavesdroppers can be checked in the two stages of the protocol, which makes the protocol highly secure. It is worth mentioning that the simultaneous quantum direct commination between users based on GHZs has been established in [20] . In this protocol, the users can obtain the messages only when Ailce announces publicly the forms of the initial and final states. Based on this announcement, Eve can directly obtain most of the messages without using potential attacks.
It is enough for her to compare the initial and final states [23] . This type of attack is called information leakage attack. The protocol, we present in this paper, is secure against such type of attack, as we will show next. Moreover, we discuss the security of the protocol against different types of attacks.
Before starting the description of the protocol we shed some light on the set of the three-particle GHZs. This set includes eight independent states, which form a complete orthonormal basis as follows:
These states can be switched into each other by applying one of the four unitary operatorŝ
z to them, where the superscript j stands for the jth-particle and the notations have the same standard meaning in the literatures. This fact is the main object in generating the keys. The users have to agree, in advance, about the following Boolean values:
There is one fact we would like to address here: why we do not consider the four-encoding processeŝ
z ? Actually, sometimes applying two operations on the states |ψ j can give the same results as follows:Î
This, of course, could be a weak point in the decoding process, however, it is a positive point in the security of the protocol since it confuses eavesdroppers. Now we are in a position to describe the protocol, which will be discussed in greater details for three users, namely, Alice, Bob and Charlie. The protocol goes as follows.
Step 1 : Alice prepares a sequence A of n + d + d ′ ordered GHZ triplets, each of which has
where the superscript k denotes the order of the triplet in the sequence A. These triplets are randomly chosen from the set given by (1) , and are already known to Alice herself. Alice takes one particle a 1 , a 2 , a 3 from each GHZ triplet to form three ordered particles sequences
Step 2: At the same time Bob and Charlie, in their sites, do the same as Alice. In this case
Bob and Charlie have the sequences
Step 3: Alice transmits the sequences A 2 and A 3 to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Similarly, Bob transmits the sequences B 1 and B 3 to Alice and Charlie, respectively. Charlie transmits C 1 and C 2 to Alice and Bob. Each sender should inform, via classical channels, the receivers before the transmission and the receivers should confirm the reception of the particles. This process is used to avoid unwanted circumstances under which Eve can impersonate one or both of the users.
The transmission of the particles occurs in blocks and the orders of the sequences are not known for the receivers. These arrangements may increase the security of the protocol.
Step 4: The users start to check the security of the channels to see if the eavesdroppers are on line or not. This should be independently performed for each sequence. We start with the Alice's sequence A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ). Bob, say, chooses randomly a large subset d of particles from the sequence A 2 and measures each of them using one of the two bases x or z. Then Bob publicly tells Alice and Charlie via a classical channel about the positions, the basis and the measurement outcome for each of the particles. Charlie, using the same bases, measures the corresponding particles from the sequence A 3 , and publicly tells the others about the results. After that Alice applies the same procedure for the particles in the home sequence A 1 . Consequently, the users can decide whether there are eavesdroppers in the line or not. Precisely, if the measurement outcomes are different, then Eve is not on line. Similar procedures have to be executed for the sequences {B 1 , B 3 } and {C 1 , C 2 }. At this step, there is no need to evaluate the error rates since the keys have not been generated yet. The final remark we should stress here is that the user, who has the home particles, should be the last one executing eavesdropper checking for the set d. This, in turn, helps in finding out the dishonest user if he or she exists.
Step 5: At this stage, we assume that each partner has his own key, and he or she wants to transmit it to the others. Therefore, each one encodes his own key in the particles of the other partners by means of the operations shown in (2) . Each one uses one operator to act simultaneously on the two particles from the different sequences, however, in the same order. For instance, suppose that Alice wants to encode the bit 1 in the jth-particle for the other partners. In this case, she should act byσ (j)
x on the j-th particle in the sequences B 1 and C 1 . Similar procedures have to be performed in Bob and Charlie sites. During the encoding process the users should be careful regarding the information and the positions of the particles of the set d ′ . The reason is that the users will sacrifice these particles when checking the eavesdroppers in the final step.
Step 6: After completing the encoding process each user transmits back the blocks of particles (message particles) to the other partners. Of course they should inform each other before transmission and after the reception of the blocks. At this stage the users obtain their original particles, but in new forms. For instance, Alice, after a successful transmission, has the sequence
)}, where the dash means that these particles are different from the original ones since now they carry the keys. It is worth mentioning that the sequences {a retrieved his own sequence of the GHZs, however, in the new forms. Thus they cannot check the eavesdroppers based on the entanglement property, e.g., [10] . In this case, the users can use the virtue of the set d ′ . As we have mentioned above, the senders know the positions of the particles of the set d ′ and the information included. Precisely, they designed their keys based on that these bits will be excluded from the generic keys. To explain this scenario we focus the attention on This protocol can be extended to N parties. In this case, at the end of the protocol, the users obtain N keys. Each user generates a sequence of N particles in the GHZs, which has the form:
where j p , j ′ p , (p = 1, ..., N ) are bits 0 or 1 according to the specified states. The users should follow the same steps discussed above. In this protocol, the users obtain the generic key by making a comparison among the N keys. The larger the numbers of the keys, the higher the probability of obtaining a secure key. This is related to the fact that Eve cannot efficiently attack many keys at the same time. She is vulnerable enough at least for one of the keys. Now we comment on the security of the proposed protocol. From the above discussion, it is obvious that we have two levels of security; before and after the encoding process. Generally, Eve can get information on the keys if she manages to obtain information about the particles before and after the encoding process. This, of course, requires that the users did not detect her in the step 4.
Suppose that we deal with ideal conditions and Eve managed to attack the travelling particles. We start the discussion with the double-CNOT attack. This attack does not disturb the channels and hence the mutual information between different users are unity, i.e., I ij = 1 where i, j = A, B, C, E.
This means that if the users are going to use only a message authentication as a security strategy, they would never be able to detect this kind of attack. The mechanism of the 2CNOT attack is as follows: In the forward path, Eve performs a first CNOT gate between the particles in transit from Alice to Bob and to Charlie (control qubits) and her ancillae (target qubits). The second CNOT gate is executed in the backward path. Restricting ourselves to Alice's particles, the scenario of the 2CNOT attack can be explained as follows. Alice keeps the first particle in her site and sends the second and third ones to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Eve executes her ancillae |0 E 2 |0 E 3 with where the users can detect her through the forward path in the step 4 with high probability. For instance, suppose that Alice uses the state |ψ 1 , where she keeps the first particle with her and sends the second and third particles to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Eve has two possibilities for choosing ancillae, namely, GHZs and z basis states. If Eve uses one of the GHZs as a faked state, according to the set (1), Eve has a probability of 1/8 to use the correct states. In this case, she has a probability of 1/3 to keep the correct particle with her pretending to be Alice. In this case, the probability that Eve is not revealed at all in a step 4, is 1/24. On the other hand, if Eve is not on the line, the measurements of the users in a control run (for the state |ψ 1 ) yield |000 and |111
with equal probability [20] . Now suppose that Eve uses the faked states from the z basis states, so what would be the probability to be detected in a control run?. If Eve qubits are one pair of the set {|0 B |0 C , |1 B |1 C }, where the subscripts B and C indicate that these particles are sent to Bob and to Charlie, respectively, the measurement results corresponding to these ancillae are {(|000 , |100 ), (|011 , |111 )}. Thus Eve will be detected, because her eavesdropping introduces an error rate equal to 1/2. When Eve's ancillae are one pair of the set {|0 B |1 C , |1 B |0 C } the users detect her with certainty. This shows that the protocol is secure against this attack.
Information leakage attack has been developed in [23] and can be explained as follows: In some of the GHZ protocols, e.g. [20] , the users obtain the keys only when Alice announces publicly its initial and final states. Thus Eve can easily obtain these results and when comparing them she obtains the keys. Actually, it has been proved, based on this attack, that Eve can obtain three bits from the transmitted four bits [23] . It is obvious that the protocol under consideration does not include such type of announcements and hence it is secure against this type of attack. We conclude by referring to the intercept-resend and disturbance attacks. They have been already studied in [20] for the GHZ protocol and showed that it is secure against these attacks. Similar arguments can be quoted for the proposed protocol. Finally, the security of the ping-pong protocol against considerable quantum channel losses is discussed in [9] . The current protocol can be treated in a quite similar way. This is based on the fact that it is enough for Eve to attack one of the travelling sequences of each users, e.g. A 2 , B 1 , C 3 . If the attention is focused on one qubit of each sequence, the treatment will be the same as that of the ping-pong protocol [9] .
In conclusion, we have presented a protocol based on the entanglement property of the GHZs.
After a complete round, the users would have many keys so that they can choose the relevant one.
There is no announcements about the forms of the states used in the protocol. This improves the efficiency of the QKD. The proposed protocol is a two-way: In the forward process the senders transmit blocks of particles to the receivers, who encode the keys in these particles and transmit them back (backward process) to the senders. Eavesdroppers have been checked through two stages. The security has been discussed against different attacks. An important remark, which guarantees the security of this protocol against considerable number of attacks, is the entanglement.
For protocols operating via entanglement, the secret information is encoded in the whole entangled state. Consequently, Eve cannot get useful information if she has obtained just a part of the entangled state. In the under consideration protocol Eve cannot access the particles of the home sequences, i.e., the particles of A 1 , B 2 , C 3 .
